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Abstract
This is an essay synthesizing the sociohistorical Gothic theory of Jose Monleon and a
theory of the grotesque developed by Edwards & Graulund, as applied to Night of the Living
Dead by George A. Romero. The study begins with a series of general theoretical and synthetic
treatments of the horror genre culminating in a consideration of the two-act theory of horror
operation, and proceeds with an application of this theoretical framework to the film Night of the
Living Dead. This analysis concludes that embedded within this film is an opportunity for critical
address for the social circumstances of its emergence, and that this potential may be
generalizable to other works in the horror genre. The work closes with a general discussion of
findings and concepts for further analysis.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Where do monsters come from? What allows them to work? What do or must audiences
bring to the experience of horror? Consider a for-instance. You are sitting in a movie theater.
You’re here with your partner, who has told you this film is “terrifying”, and people are saying
it’s one of the best horror movies this year. The film begins, and it’s been rolling for about 15
minutes, when suddenly something emerges from a dank cellar. Or the woods. Or the sky. Or
from inside a supporting character. What is that thing? It’s half man, half animal, half machine,
half insect, half luminous cloud. It’s a thing made of contradictions, of fearful combinatorials,
and it wants the protagonist dead. You are terrified. This monster is libidinous, is cannibalistic, is
sexually ambiguous, is of questionable origin. It not only wants to destroy the protagonist, it
wants to bring to an end the American way of life. Or the British way of life. Or the Spanish way
of life. Luckily, through great effort, the plucky, comfortably normative protagonist (he is
straight, his provenance is known, he is probably handsome, he is probably a “he”) destroys this
mass of monstrous contradictions. He gets the girl, the American way is saved, and you feel
good. On reflection, why? What has allowed this story to so deftly play on your sense of what is
whole, what is monstrous, and why has its banishment been so satisfying? What did you just see?
Questions as to the origins of horror and the horror experience seem often to center on
what makes a monster. A great variety of theorists have tried their hands at defining what
constitutes monstrosity, what makes it function, what makes a monster, and why people feel
compelled to expose themselves to narratives of monstrosity year in and year out. While I think
many of these theories are useful in their description and operation, I think many of them stop
short of the kinds of explanation that would make such a discussion truly tractive, and that they
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instead spend their time in description. Such description is again quite useful, but it doesn’t do
the whole job.
One of the first theorists of the horrific was Ann Radcliff, author of the now seminal
essay, “The Supernatural in Poetry.” In the form of a dialogue, she allows two of her characters
to wax theoretical in their experience of Shakespeare, particularly his use of description, clear
and unclear, to create his emotional effects. Her conversationalists conclude through their
discussion that the primary difference between horror and terror, two emotions which will be
made distinct through the history of horror theorization, lies in the level of ambiguity present in
the representation. Terror is described as a definitional indeterminacy, a sense of unclarity
preceding the actually experience of its object. In this way, terror is a route to the sublime, itself
an emotion which combines effect with ambiguity of lack of full knowledge. Horror, in contrast,
is the experience of the horrific object in its wholeness. If terror is the noise behind the closed
door, horror is the shambling thing revealed. This same framework has been taken up by other
theorists, most popularly contemporary horror author Stephen King, in his book Danse Macabre,
where he makes a further distinction between Horror and Gross-Out. Radcliffe’s distinction is
instructive. This thesis will concern itself primarily with the second element she considers,
Horror, insofar as it will primarily be addressed not to the experience of horror, but to the reality
of horrific objects. In Radcliffe’s terminology, I will primarily be concerned with Horror rather
than Terror.
Whence then comes Horror? As mentioned above, while true explanations of the
emergence of horrific imagery, the “origin story” of monsters, is a rarity, a great many writers
have described monsters and their qualities in phenomenal depth. While there is a great deal of
accord in these descriptions, they do diverge at points. Philosopher Noel Carroll’s description of
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monsters centers on their status as “category violations,” uniting domains or categories of human
thought that should not go together. Anthropologist David Gilmore describes them instead as
possessing recognizably human traits, even if these traits remain as limited as the possession of
agency, though possessing at least one quality that is blown out of proportion. Monstrous teeth or
claws quite often serve this purpose. Medievalist Jeffrey Cohen does not give a comprehensive
definition, instead describing monsters according to their participation in a field of qualities,
esconcing these in Seven Theses, including such elements as, “The Monstrous Body is the
Cultural Body,” and “The Monster is a Harbinger of Category Crisis.” His description, as with
the other theorists mentioned, seem to describe monsters both according to their qualities and
according to what they “do.” Jose Monleon, who I will be using for the majority of my treatment,
describes monsters somewhat according to Cohen’s “cultural body” thesis, identifying them as
reflections or representations of cultural designations centering on contribution or lack of
contribution to wider cultural aims.
There are some useful commonalities between these definitions. First and foremost, all of
these theorists define monsters according to their bringing together of incompatible elements.
Monsters should not be, within a traditional model of the universe, or at least they should not be
as they are. Whether the elements a monster brings together in a single agent are exaggerations
or modifications of elements which may natively belong together, or whether they are more
radical composites uniting qualities which should never be brought together in a single figure,
they are in every instance a confluence of incompatible parts. Secondly, this combinatoriality
makes monsters threatening. It’s not enough that a figure unite two elements that should not go
together--this coming together must constitute something of a threat to their observers. Monsters
must be seen, and they must be seen as dangerous.
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This is a very good description of what monsters are and what they look like, and its
elements are shared to a great extent between theorists coming from a good variety of academic
fields. What it is not, however, is an explanation of how monsters emerge. To touch on the two
elements common to theoretical definitions, what is it that allows us to identify a monster as
constituting a categorical violation, a combination which should not be? And according to what
criteria can such a representation be considered threatening? These questions are necessary
preconditions for what may become a more interesting question: How have monsters been
deployed in the past for critical effect? That is, knowing the raison d'etre of monstrosity is the
elicitation of terror and horror, how have artists used an expectation of this effect in order to
deploy imagery with a critical cultural effect?
This thesis will attempt to synthesize a potential answer to the above three questions. In
the present work, I will first explore the sociohistorical operation of the horror genre within an
historical context using theorist Jose Monleon’s concept of “unreason” through a theory of the
grotesque. This will consist of an exploration and some instantiations of Monleon’s theory, as
well as an exploration of how this theory interacts with the broader conception of a grotesque
aesthetic. I will then explore how the operation of this sociohistorical function relies upon
systems of audience knowledge and presupposition. To do this, I will rely on theories of
intertextuality, as well as the work of rhetorician Kendall Phillips in order to understand how the
presuppositional structure of the horror genre may open the way for critical effect. To provide an
artifactual backbone, to these theoretical considerations, I will ground my analysis in an
occasional analysis of the film Night of the Living Dead by George A. Romero.
Horror has been theorized as long as it’s been a recognized genre, and as such I have no
expectation that I will close any book whatsoever in this conversation. As is apparent in
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examining the commonalities between theorists of the monstrous, even those coming from
entirely distinct disciplines, I believe many theorists are describing the same phenomena in their
work, and I will retread much ground that has already been trod here. However, I will attempt
within this work to synthesize something a bit new, to integrated a number of theoretical
perspectives to internally consistently answer our three questions--What categories do monsters
violate? What makes these violations threatening? How has this been used to critical effect? If I
am able to construct something like a coherent synthesis capable of answering these question
without mishandling the vast theoretical lore that the horror genre has generated, I think I will
have accomplished something.

9
Chapter 2: Horror as Sociohistorical Grotesque
In this chapter, I’ll adumbrate theorist, critic, and Spanish-language author Jose
Monleon’s approach to the sociohistorical evolution of the Gothic genre and its passage through
distinct relationships with the social body. I’ll then briefly explore this theory as an interpretation
or instantiation of the Grotesque, derived from Edwards and Graulund’s formulation (as well as
those of others), in order to understand the shifts in representation through Monleon’s epochs.
Monleon and Sustained Unreason
In A Specter is Haunting Europe, Jose Monleon’s only significant work translated into
English, he takes an approach to the gothic genre situated in terms of its historical evolution
against the events of the emerging era of industrialism within which it flourished. He
characterizes the development of notions of the supernatural gothic genre as located within a
broader social context informing possible locations of the monstrous. To accomplish this, he
borrows Todorov’s characterization of the fantastic to refer to gothic monstrosity (Monleon 3).
According to his account, at the time of the earliest works of Gothic fiction, monstrosity is
essentially an artifact of the outskirts, something that occurs in poor-houses and mad-houses and
work-houses (30-31). Each of these is a habitation designed to contain, confine, and delimit the
location of that which is conceived of as threateningly external. As the age progresses, however,
and as industrialism takes root within England, this strict locationality begins to decay, and the
monstrous externality of the poor, the mad, the criminal, is gradually reintegrated with society.
This is accompanied by a shift in the ways the culture conceived of the monstrous. From a
phenomenon of the outskirts, the fantastic and monstrous, that which was characterized by a
spirit of unreason, was found to be implicit in the very structures of order according to which
culture operated. Within fantastic literary output, this shift was reflected through portrayals of
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monstrosity which originated from within the body of society itself. Reason became the birthing
place of unreason.
While Monleon’s approach to these concepts emerges as essentially economic, it not a
stretch to extend them to cultural categories as such. Within his treatment, Monleon identifies the
unreason he describes with absence of utility or belonging within the economic systems within
the cultures he describes. What this means is that the poor, the indigent, the mentally ill who
exemplify the kinds of unreasoned actors who find their way into representations of the Gothic
monstrous are characterized as such by virtue of their lack of placement within the society at
large. Within the machinery of Victorian England, those who were useless seemed to defy the
subjectivizing and ordering logic of the industrial ethos, embodying an impossibility of category
which therefore placed them in tension with the culture which created them. The character by
which these individuals are therefore in conflict with the machinery of the culture in which they
live but cannot economically participate seems to be an instantiation of a broader impossibility of
belonging. Either economically or otherwise, this seems to be an instance of the “othering” of
those for whom there is no place, a phenomenon certainly not limited to the realm of the
economic.
It would seem intuitive that order, either economic or social, would have to exist as a
precedent to the emergence of disorder--it’s not a coincidence that the gothic genre as identified
by Monleon only began to exist at the emergence of enlightenment thinking, a paradigm which
envisioned the world as an ordered system in which humans might be rational participants.
Monleon’s evolution inward seems to reflect the increasing immanence of the unreason he
describes as the culture becomes increasingly ordered, increasingly coherent. As the society
evolves into greater and greater manifestations of social order, more and more is consumed, is
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normalized, is foreclosed, resulting in a system in which nothing is rejected, nothing is on the
“outside.” Though nothing then exists on the outside, monstrosity remains. Crime, poverty,
instability, violence--each of these persists as a cultural reality, a site of internal contradiction
within the cultural substrate. It is almost as though the need to place these monstrous elements
within a culture led to an ever-intensifying cultural anxiety as to the location of monstrosity.
What was once safely on the outskirts, blameable and distant, suddenly erupted from within the
cultural heart. Absent a safely identifiable externality, the culture had no choice but to find
unreason within its own heart.
Monleon himself contextualizes his approach to the Gothic within Todorov’s fantastic,
which is that synaptic time between the presentation of the ambiguously fantastical and its
collapse either into true fantasy or its revelation as an explicable illusion (Todorov 25). As such,
the fantastic is characterized as a suspended unreason, an indeterminacy. Monleon doesn’t argue
but instead suggests in the scope of his survey that this fantastic is most often experienced as
horrific. Just as the fantastic is defined as that space of unknowing, so horror does not inhere
within objects and agents, per se, but in the uncertainty, the violation potentiated in their
discategoricity. In this regard, Monleon’s interpretation of Todorov echoes contemporary
theorists of the horror genre. One such is Noel Carroll, who identifies horror not only with
monsters who are grotesque, who transect and disrupt traditional categories, but also with the
“curiosity” felt by readers and viewers to make sense of this categorical violation (Carroll 182).
The emotional impetus of this horror and of the fantastic is then to collapse disorder, to
disassemble and reorder the unreason of these representations.
To put a term to this indeterminacy, one might be able to recognize the existence of
Monleon’s unreasoned Gothic as a categorical insolubility. To borrow from Carroll again, the
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monstrous is not that which is merely threatening, merely problematic, merely antagonistic. The
hallmark of the horrific instead is that which defies even such a definitive categorization. To
approach the horrific, the Gothic, isn’t merely to approach that which is an object of fear. The
kind of fear which would be necessary to characterize a phenomenon as truly horrific would be
that which derives its quality of fear from its very “wrongness.” Such a notion of the horrific
finds some backing in the enlightenment ideal itself. In the dream of an ordered world, in a
culture which finds its sense of identity even within and through the application of reason, of
order, would not the ability of an entity or representation to defy this categorization itself
embody the terrifying par-excellence? In such an interpretation, the certainty of death or harm
would not be horrific--the truly horrific would defy even the certainty of destruction.
While this is a useful way to imagine the relations between culture and literature as they
evolved through the Gothic, what might these shifts in portrayal mean for the categories against
which the horrific fantastic was written? If the horrific fantastic is a function, as Monleon argues,
of unreason, then what is the character of this unreason, and how might it be deployed in
addressing itself to the reasoned categoricities of the culture at large?
The Unreasoned as Grotesque
The grotesque offers a useful way of responding to this question. Edwards and Graulund
characterize the grotesque as that aesthetic that emerges from the combination of contradictory
elements, the bombastic and unexpected, the definitionally discategorical (Edwards and
Graulund 16). Within a grotesque aesthetic, categories are pressed together to the breaking point,
made to play unkindly with their peers, such that through a violation of order, disorder is able to
express forms of truth about the violated categories in a manner unavailable to traditional
expression. The grotesque is then an aesthetic of essential unreason, of disruption and fantasy,
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even when those fantasies are essentially un-fantastic. Not only does the grotesque allow the
expression of hidden figures of reason through deployment of unreason, but these expressions
are often unavailable to a traditional aesthetic. By portraying the contradictions inherent within a
culture, either ontologically or traditionally, the grotesque forces a reassessment of the
relationship between these combinatorials (Edwards and Graulund 3). To formulate it neatly, the
grotesque uses what is available and contradictory in order to express that which is true and
unavailable.
A few words are justified here pursuant to the relationship between the grotesque and the
wider culture. If the grotesque is that aesthetic which combines elements which fall outside
traditional cultural schemes of what is allowed to be appended to what, where do these
conceptions come from? Let’s say we are discussing a classical representation of monstrosity--a
werewolf perhaps. Analysis of this sort will be carried on in greater length below, but what is it
about the two elements so combined--wolf and man--that disqualifies them from unity within our
cultural scheme? The answer to this question is entirely contingent upon the cultural milieu into
which these representations enter. They are, in other words, entirely conventional.
For example, although a cultural rule against human/animal hybridity exists within our
knowledge-culture, it does not inhere everywhere. It is, in a phrase, conventional rather than
axiomatic. In many cultures, historically and today, human/animal hybrids are believed to exist,
are understood to exist in the same axiomatic sense mentioned above. To counter this notion by
suggesting that we (that is, those of us in the intellectually industrialized Western World) “have
it right” as regards the proper prescription as to what might might-not properly go together runs
into another issue. This second problem is that such a notion fails to account for problematic
combinatorialities that exist within our culture, but which our conventions of eliding particularity
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for the sake of an easily generalizable “truth” have rendered as existing outside that
conventionality. For example, documents legislating the proper use of animal tissues in human
medical therapies have existed in the EU for at least a decade. However, because of our
conventions for naming these processes and realities, and because of the localized knowledgesystems in which these ideas are stored and abstracted, we are able to keep from running up
against any cultural rule against hybridity which might render such medical processes
grotesque.The grotesque is therefore the terminology I will use here to describe those images
which directly contradict only culturally prevalent and not absolute notions of proper
combinatoriality.
This aside opens up space for another discussion: are representations of the grotesque
limited to agents or monsters in the traditional sense, or are such threatening combinatorialities
capable of existing disarticulated from agentive representation? That is, although two elements
which ought not go together are easily combined within a single agent, a single image, is this the
only place they may combine? Going briefly back to our theoretical overview, if we are to take
as a representative of the categorical violation our terminology grotesque, and if monstrosity
would seem to emerge when this grotesquery is put into combination with an air of threat, where
might this combination--problematic combination and threat--inhere in our culture outside
traditional representations of horror imagery?
If the characteristics that define a horror monster are disarticulated from agents and are
allowed to be identified within the culture at large, then horror quickly becomes something more
complex and less encapsulable. Philosopher George Sieg describes such a possibility in his work
“Infinite Regress.” According to such a disarticulation, horror as a psychological experience of
threatening combinatoriality is synonymous with its very possibility. That is, the very idea that
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there is something unpredictably and unknowably “horrific” out there is itself experienced as
horrific. As such, Sieg argues, horror has a self-compounding quality unique among aesthetic
experiences. If we are to accept such a theory, it would mean that the grotesque, and horror by
extension, are best imagined as the very awareness of the possibility of themselves. While it may
be easiest to identify the grotesquery or horror of a specific agent, nameable monster, the
experience of the grotesque or horrific is not strictly limited to artistic representations, but
instead may inhere in our experience of reality, including our sociohistorical reality.
The grotesque, in its more limited aesthetic sense, has been used in the past as a means of
understanding the output of the Gothic era, but not extensively. Novak has used the Grotesque as
a means of illuminating the contrast between Gothic and the sublime. While the sublime,
similarly to the grotesque, trucks in the expression of that which is inexpressible through what
resources are available, the grotesque differs qualitatively in the kinds of emotions thus revealed.
If the grotesque leads to a sublimity, it’s within a negative sublime, where disorder and
disruption are experienced as a concealed truth (Novak 59). The ineffable bucolic then becomes
something more akin to a desolate revelation, and traditional, mundane beauty must be negated
through defilement and disruption in order to reveal concealed aesthetic truths. Bakhtin’s
treatment of the carnivalesque may also be seen as a kind of grotesque, though not overtly (10),
although he does notably address theories of the grotesque as expressed on bodies later in the
same work (303). Through the inversion of traditioned orders, the grotesque may argue, the truth
of those orders is revealed and reinforced. The violation, the transgression, the unreason,
provides the backdrop against which such inversion is capable of expressing what traditional
aesthetics are not. The crowned jester is made grotesque, and through this grotesquery we
question the epistemic domains of clown and crown, so to speak.
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There have been variable explorations of the grotesque which have emphasized different
elements of these representation. While the approach I’ve chosen emphasizes the contradictory
elements of grotesque representation, other theorists have indicated that through its historical
usage, the grotesque has come to be usable to describe anything from a two-headed toad to a
Higher Truth (Harpham, 467). Other theorists have emphasized the role of the comic or the
absurd in tempering grotesque representations, even going so far as to indicate that this
absurdity--a gentle neutering of threat--is a necessary requisite to the existence of a grotesque
representation (Stieg, 258). I have adopted the more simplified, non-synthetic interpretation of
the concept here in order to emphasize what I believe to be its most essential element: the
combination within an aesthetic of two elements which do not belong together in order to
accomplish an objective otherwise unavailable. In this way, the grotesque bears a passing
resemblance to the sublime, an aesthetic tradition with an analogous history of divergent
interpretation, a resemblance which other theorists have noted (Chao). As I said, I will stand by a
more streamlined definition for ease of use, but it bears being said that other theorists have
variously complexified this relatively simple super-structure.
What new relations might be revealed if we bring together Monleon’s diachronic
treatment of fantastic fiction and Edwards and Graulund’s treatment of the grotesque? Each of
the movements through which Monleon’s theory passes becomes a different site for imagining
an operation of the grotesque. From the earliest stages of the Monleon’s Gothic, monstrosity is
situated on the outskirts of society, cloaked in age and decrepitude. The Castle of Otranto is the
example he gives. The grotesquery at work in such portrayals, the categorical contradiction,
emerges at the uncomfortable suture between past and present. What is monstrous in these
portrayals is the coming together of progress and history in disharmony, and a grotesque reading
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would demand a questioning of the categoricity of each of these domains. If the past and present
collide violently, horrifically, what is it in their natures which demands such a violent response?
Monleon’s contention would be that these collisions exemplify a conflict between old social
orders and emergent enlightenment ideals (32). The enlightenment, through seeking an absolute
capture through the rejection of dis-order, un-reason, jettisons the past as inherently dangerous
and retrograde. This changes during the middle and late Gothic. In these works, monstrosity, and
so the foundations for the grotesque, are resituated as emerging from within the social body. No
longer are monsters on the outskirts--they’re in the house. The grotesque within the midVictorian era, during the age of gothic production after the turn of the Nineteenth century,
constitutes a nightmare of enlightenment. If the Enlightenment’s capture can’t exorcise the
demons of grotesquery, they must emerge from the premises of the enlightenment impulse itself.
If the originary agents of unreason, as explored by Monleon, are those who fell through
the cracks of ordering impulses of the industrializing age, how might a grotesque theorizing of
their status illuminate the qualities according to which they find themselves in conflict with the
culture which created them? What descriptors do these people possess which transforms them
into inherent contradictions? They obviously are not monstrous in any traditional understanding
of the word. They possess an identifiable humanity, agency, bodies, names. This very fact of
their humanity, however, may be of of the two elements of their identity which finds itself in
conflict within a grotesque interpretation. If one element of their grotesquery is their humanity,
what might find itself in inherent contradiction with their status as human? The answer to this
question is their very defiance of the systems of human-subjectivizing which was the bar-forentry for humanity during an era when humanity was identified with industry. They are human-body, mind, soul. They are inhuman--economically useless, lacking ability to contribute to the
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social body. Within Monleon’s interpretation of sociohistorical unreason, the grotesque person is
no more or less than he or she who is useless.
Some Instances of the Grotesque
While this interpretation of unreason as an operation of the grotesque has a degree of
intuitive appeal, an illustration may be necessary to see how this relation has persisted through
works of the gothic and horrific fiction during the time period about which Monleon wrote. The
purpose of the following will be to track this evolutionary movement within the changing
premises of the Gothic through three works of mid-to-late Gothic fiction. The works which have
been selected for this task were picked for their varying representation for the origins of
monstrosity: from within, from space between, and from without. Each of the works considered
here fall within the purview of industrialized Gothicism as identified by Monleon--however,
because he only considers a single one of these works within his treatment, the variability of the
ways in which monstrosity– grotesquery– expressed itself is left ambiguous.
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, published anonymously in 1818, is the exemplar Monleon
uses to explore the industrialized Gothic, citing the emergence of monstrosity from within the
premises of normativity. Victor Frankenstein does not encounter monstrosity on the outskirts, but
instead becomes the architect of a more localized rarefaction. Within this work, Frankenstein
does not discover the monster within a periphery, or even have its reality foist upon him. Rather,
he creates this representation of the monstrous. The ease with which modern readers and
commentators collapse man and monster--each of whom is commonly referred to as
“Frankenstein”--is itself a small testament to the identification between monster and man,
unreason and reason
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To apply a grotesque interpretation to this monstrosity would begin with the question,
what is thrown into conflict? Where does discategoricity inhere? In the case of Frankenstein’s
monster, an obvious answer might be the union of medicalized death and medicalized life. With
industrialization in Europe came the industrialization of medicality, a perception of the body as
machine. This dual expression of human nature, as both machine and mind, agent and
automaton, can be seen as a manifestation of monstrosity, pointing to a contradiction seated
within the heart of what it is to be thinking flesh. This is a perspective popularized lately by
modern Gothic author Thomas Ligotti. To his approach, life itself becomes grotesque in its
collapse of agent and non-agent. Once minds may become untethered from bodies, how does one
differentiate herself from the nameless monster’s Grotesque conceptual collapse?
This theme of monstrous locationality is not limited to ontologically impossible agents.
Wuthering Heights was published in 1847, only a year before Emily Bronte--who published the
work under a pseudonym--passed away. For all this work’s passage through time, its locale is
oppressively isolated. Shuttling essentially between two locations, two estates estranged by the
eerie moors, this story is a primer in the ability to create sensations of distance and isolation
within locality. The story’s characters, confusing as they do an internalistic respectability and
alienating otherness, become monstrous even as they participate in tropes located at the heart of
standard Victorian fare. In fact, they could not be monstrous if they were not at once so familiar.
The grotesquery portrayed in Wuthering Heights is a bit more difficult to locate, situated
as it is within a concatenation of foreignness and locality--Heathcliff’s foreign birth and adoption
makes him an agentive contradiction, a Weird character in the sense used by Mark Fisher, as a
union of two elements that simply do not go together--his presence evokes an indefinable unease.
This work also participates in Fisher’s theory of the Eerie, the presence or absence of that which
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should or should not be so. Geoffrey Harpham has argued that the grotesque functions most
effectively when the world into which it enters is largely normative. The creation of the eerie
seems to suggest this same necessity--how can abnormality be portrayed, how can unreason be
outlined, without the backdrop of reasonable expectation? Heathcliff does not simply become a
monstrous outsider--he is situated as a consummate insider, though grotesquely so. He is landed,
and his situation within the novel suggests an inversion, a perversion of the function normally
reserved for a normative character.
Bram Stoker’s Dracula, published in 1897, continues the trend toward portrayals of
localized externality, though in a two-handed fashion; while the story begins in a locale
reminiscent of Monleon’s pre-Industrial Gothic, all drooping cobwebs and eclectic castles, these
representations then invade Jonathan Harker’s normalized world. As Dracula moves into
London, he brings corruption with him, not only as a material reality, but as a conversion
experience. He is not simply an agent of unreason, but a disseminator of abnormality. Even the
fixtures with which he arrives on Western shores indicate this nature--wolves, bats, and rats all
harken his arrival, as though the plague-infested old-world had come to despoil a modern age.
Count Dracula’s categorical grotesqueries are quite standard for the horror genre, uniting
as he does notions of consumption and sexuality, death and life, foreignness and immanence.
One way in which this representation differs, however, is in the capacity of this externality to
pollute. Dracula’s curse and so the primary signifier of his ontologically foreign nature, spreads
to others, invades and converts the local to this radical outsider status. To illuminate this move,
Kristeva’s formulation of the abject appears early through imagery that is grotesque with
reference to normal bodies--filth, waste, dung, spasm, vomiting (2). These effects don’t simply
exist as additional objects, as the monstrosity of Dracula couldn’t simply exist as another
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Western subject. The grotesque abject threatens to collapse those systems of order into which it
irrupts, a conversion of reason to unreason, an unholy collapse.
What then do these representations have in common? Is it possible to come to any
conclusion regarding the grotesque representations of these novels within their historical
context? While it’s difficult to draw any sweeping conclusions from such a small set, it does
seem to be the case that these works carry out Monleon’s assertion as to the particular nature of
Industrial Gothic. In each of these stories, on contrast to pre-Industrial Gothicism, the monstrous
representations seem to spill into, to merge with the normalized social body. In contrast to
preceding Gothic forms, where the story was either situated in or projected back into an exotic
world, often alienated in both time and space, these works bring the monstrous home, so to
speak, seeming to collapse and complicate notions of internal and external.
What of this collapse as a grotesque representation? If the incongruous categories brought
into conflict to constitute the Industrial Gothic are internality and externality, a grotesque
aesthetic interpretation would ask the question, what of these categories? Is the very possibility
of their unity a suggestion of their mutability? In his work on monstrosity, anthropologist David
Gilmore has suggested that cultures permit monsters to transgress culturally cherished
boundaries in order to exemplify concepts of threat. From this vantage point, it would seem to be
the case that this concept of internality is just such a cherished boundary. Drawing from Mary
Douglas’s work, particularly Purity and Danger, Gilmore has suggested that such portrayals and
stories of transgression serve a reaffirming role, function as a ritual impurity which, through
banishment, reinforces such categories as internal/external, foreign/local. Representations of the
Grotesque then become sites simultaneously for questioning the categorical limitations of
boundary and for reaffirming the stability of these demarcations.
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Chapter 3: Horrific Assumptions and Horrific Effect
The previous chapter has been devoted to identifying unreason as instantiation of a
grotesque aesthetic, as well as how this conceptualization allows us to imagine horrific
representations as embodying contradictions within the social body. The question remains: how
do audiences approach this contradiction? How is such contradiction activated within audiences?
This chapter will then be devoted to understanding the two-step operation of audience
presupposition, its reliance upon audience knowledge. Within this operation, I will also explore
the potential opened for critical effect, the possibility of breaking away from the reactionary
architectures of the monstrous as cultural contradiction.
Two-Act Horror and the Possibility of Effect
Historically, the horror genre tends to be reactionary, overdetermined, and defined by a
relationship to its subject matter that leaves little space for rhetorical mobility. Horror is a space
of what Mikhail Bakhtin refers to as the “carnivalesque,” a place in which violation is allowed
because it is to be quashed (5-8). In many ways, the history of the horror genre is a history of
reactionary politics, profoundly conservative morality, and an almost obsessive fixation on
normativity. If horror can be thought of as a genre of “ritual defilement,” then the reason it is
tolerable--and even enjoyable, for some--is because it holds out the potential for a return to
normalcy. This return is almost always a reaffirmation of what is “real” or “normative,” a
repudiation of the abnormality which constitutes horrific antagonism. Not only are the objects
which populate horror narrative surprisingly consistent through its history, but so too are the
narrative reactions to it. Vampires, hauntings, possessions have been treated overwhelmingly
similarly since the beginning of the horror genre as follows: the choice is destruction or
integration.

23
The kinds of recurring objects which populate the genre may be, however, the source of
its critical potential. The reason for the special power the horror genre possesses is its making of
statements with ontological impact--horror makes claims about reality via presentation of
unreality, and it makes value judgments about those statements. Carroll makes a distinction
between the kinds of statements made by horror and other thriller genres. According to
Paradoxes of the Heart, his theoretical analysis of art-horror, Carroll claims horror possesses a
specialized status as a genre in part because it does not simply make statements about what is
not, as any fictionalized narrative does, but instead makes statements about what cannot possibly
be (16). This distinction is accompanied within art-horror by a particular protagonistic
orientation toward the objects of these statements: the emotion of fear. This is what sets horror
apart from mere fantasy. Historian Farah Mendlesohn identifies the general class of fantasy to
which horror belongs, the intrusion fantasy, in which unreality or impossibility presses itself
forcibly into a widely normative world (115). However, to take Carroll’s framework, these
unreal objects are not sufficient unto themselves to define a narrative as horrific--there must also
be a judgment, or a specific and evaluative emotional response (16-17).
An issue in this line of argument presents itself. Critics have sometimes addressed the
question as to whether or not horror is even capable of articulating ideological or social critique.
After all, if the statements horror makes are about things not found in any reality, and if the
judgments it makes about these statements are almost uniformly normative, then can it be
claimed that such statements are capable of affecting an audience’s notions of normalcy and
response? Horror theorist Noel Carroll would, problematically, respond in the negative to this
question. He would state that the horror genre is neutered in terms of its potential for social
critique by the same component that gives it distinction. Because the horror genre makes
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judgments about statements that “cannot possibly be,”--i.e. wolf-men, vampires, ghostly dolls-these judgments are about nothing at all (199-201). After all, what does it matter if I say that
ghostly dolls are threateningly grotesque and should be destroyed? A ghostly doll has never run
for congress, and I’m not likely to encounter any such ontological aberration in my own life.
One issue with Carroll’s response is that, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the cultural
categories on which his distinction rests are significantly more culture-bound than he admits in
his treatment. While haunted dolls do not exist in our culture, they may exist in another culture.
Conversely, things which we may claim objectively exist within our culture may be in the realm
of fantasy for another. Almost any modern form of technology would seem supernatural to
anyone alive fifty years ago, and to many people who still live in largely pre-technological
cultures. Carroll’s claim that the judgments of art-horror are neutered by the ontological
categories to which the judged objects/statements belong is undercut by the socially constructed
nature of these categories. He neatly bypasses this issue by labeling works which truck in horrific
effect without ontic violation “thrillers,” a distinction which he acknowledges as arbitrary, but
the line must be somewhere, right?
Still other theorists have sidestepped this issue of unreality entirely and claimed that it is
instead horror’s unique relationship with themes of existentialism and ontological
discombobulation which make it a prime site for this kind of cultural understanding. Philosopher
Stuart Hanscomb claims existential theory can be understood as horrific, or that our
understanding of an existential perspective can be enhanced by an understanding of how horror
operates, given the tendency of each subject to dramatize and destabilize our relationship with
reality and our place within it (1-6). Philosopher Eugene Thacker has gone even further in this
direction, and argues in In the Dust of this Planet that horror is itself an existential tool for
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coming to terms with the idea of a “world without-us” (8-9). To both of these theorists, horror is
seen as existentially therapeutic, given the emotions or worldview embedded within its treatment
of violation.
The modern horror genre has at times attempted to bear out the optimistic perspective as
to horror’s potency for cultural effect. Contemporary horror has demonstrated a powerful interest
in and potential for social impact, with such films as Get Out drawing massive crowds while
simultaneously using the horror space to generate social critique. In Get Out, a black man is
brought to meet his white girlfriend’s family on their palatial estate. It’s only after he arrives that
he realizes something dreadful is afoot, and he narrowly escapes losing his mind—quite literally-to the twisted desires of the whitewashed antagonists. His unawares manipulation by the white
characters of the film then mirrors the subtle and not-so-subtle manipulation African-Americans
may experience in normative White culture at large. Here the horror genre can be understood as
using audience understanding of one form of manipulation in order to illuminate the other.
This use of audience knowledge to leverage effect is not new. Historically, horror has
repeatedly used the expectations which come with its labelling to address itself directly to the
ideology of its audiences. The horror genre has always been powerfully intertextual, and has
frequently drawn on what rhetorician James Porter refers to as “presupposition” for
comprehensibility (35-36). That is, horror often makes demands on the audience to bring certain
forms of knowledge, genre-keyed understanding, to their experience of art-horror. Audiences
who fail to bring this knowledge are often left out of the full modern horror experience,
particularly in contemporary examples from the genre, when the conventions and operations of
horror narrative themselves become objects of address. The rigorous intertextuality of much
modern horror nearly demands an audience schooled in horror convention. Who will live? Who
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will die? Where will the ghoul strike next? It is the suite of answers to such questions that form a
substrate of generic expectation out of which much contemporary horror story operates.
Presupposition doesn’t only operate on the level of meta-narrativity, however. Because
horror is a genre of specific audience response, generally fear, it often relies on violation of
audience expectation in order to function. A natural question is how this can occur in a genre
seemingly so reactionary and entrenched in tradition. If horror relies on violational statements for
effect, how can such violation occur within such a small selection of tropes? There are two
responses to this, both of which answer this conundrum by pointing to changes within the horror
genre itself. These two forms of change could be termed inter-generic and intra-generic. The
former is that which occurs when one genre begins spill into another, as when a film promises
romance only to subvert the audience’s romantic expectation with horrific effect. The latter is
that which occurs when an element within the genre itself shifts or intensifies, as when each new
iteration of a horror franchise ups the ante in terms of blood, guts, or effects. In either case,
horror relies on a great deal of presuppositional knowledge in its audiences in order to function
properly. This wealth of knowledge, as I will show, serves as the jumping off point for horror’s
possible effects.
Horror then operates by presenting the audience with a statement in the form of a horrific
presentation, then judges this statement and disposes of it accordingly. Not only this, but horror
also relies on the audience’s expectations for what kinds of statements constitute this horrific
class and what kinds of judgment are appropriate thereto. This one-two generic punch has been
imagined by numerous theorists to be a site of social impact.
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The Rhetorical Maneuver and Horrific Criticality
In further understanding the play between expectation and delivery, and how this play
may become a site for critical effect, it may be useful to step for a moment into rhetorical
territory. Kendall Phillips articulated what he referred to as the “rhetorical maneuver” in order to
resolve what he saw as an inherent tension within postmodern notions of subjectivity. According
to Phillips, postmodernism motivated a replacement of traditional notions of personal identity
with a new idea of subjectivity. Within this framework, identity is simultaneously fluid and
multiple, while at the same time determined by context and social disciplinarity (310-312). In
order to account for this dual-nature of fluidity and overdetermination, Phillips devised the
rhetorical maneuver to describe the space which opens between determination and deployment
within the operation of subjectivity. He posits the instance of identity as a specific, contextbound “position,” into which a subjectivity is performed as “form” (312-317). Position is then
the situational space for identity to occupy, say as a teacher or student, while form is the specific
performance within that space which may or may not cohere with the expected performance. The
rhetorical maneuver, as Phillips describes it, occurs when an individual deploys a form not
appropriate to the social position specified by context (317-318). As, to use his example, when a
student deploys the form of “new father” in order to request additional time on a school
assignment. He has stepped outside the expected student position, and subverted expectation by
delivering a subject form of “new father.”
In order to understand how the rhetorical maneuver can be applied to genre deployment,
it’s necessary to understand the structure of subjectivity as portrayed by Phillips as a dialectic of
expectation and delivery. The maneuver occurs in time. He characterizes that which precedes the
form of deployment, the position, as something which temporally precedes the deployed form of
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the subjective performance (Phillips 319-320). Put another way, Phillips’ rhetorical maneuver
assumes presupposition on the part of the audience and rhetorically subverts this expectation to
bring about a specific effect. In the case of Phillips’ example, this is more time on an assignment.
In the case of the horror genre, it is possibility of critical effect in the audience.
If subjectivity is seen as a kind of per-form-ance within an expected position, then the
horror genre, as its own kind of performance, can be seen as responding to the disciplinarity of
audience requirements to possess the label horror--genre, to borrow a term, must be hailed as
such. In other words, both subjectivity and genre are best understood as dynamics of expectation
and delivery along disciplinary lines. If this is so, the horror genre is a specialized kind of genresubject which is defined by its self-conscious adherence the expectations which precede it. A
horrific genre-subjectivity would be one which is defined by its insistence on always delivering
on audience expectation in a two-part performance: horrific statement and narratorial judgment.
If we allow the preceding use of Phillips’ framework to understand performance broadly,
we have opened up a new means of understanding not only the violational operation of the horror
genre, but violation more broadly. By making this turn, we are enabled to see Phillips’ rhetorical
maneuver as a means of conceptualizing transgressive expression generally within spaces of
determined expectation, and horror as only a specialized instance of this possibility. In this
framework, a transgressive communication would be any whose form deviates from the
expectational position which precedes it. The horror genre is distinguished in this case by the fact
that it makes statements not only about it’s narratorial objects, but concerns these objects with
violation of what is considered possible.
Genre theory can also be used to understand this transition. Rhetorician Carolyn Miller’s
concept of genre as structuration within rhetorical community can be imagined as the position

29
within which a genre piece’s form is deployed (70-71). In Miller’s theory, genre is the
reproducible network of communicative elements which have become traditionalized within a
culture for creating particular effects. Almost like brain-synapses, these tradition-worn pathways
of expression constitute the call which specific pieces of communication answer, and so are
made comprehensible (71-72). If one imagines this illustration overlaid on the position vs. form
contrast which Phillips specifies, the distinction between recognizable-as and possible, realworld expression-of would become the space between Phillips’ position and form.
The horror genre is in no way privileged in the ways in which it can be understood
through this specific lens of expectation and delivery. That said, while it is not privileged in
being able to be understood in these terms, it is interesting as a genre which specifically concerns
itself with violations of what is possible, in Carroll’s terms. In this way, it bears a certain
resemblance to the avant-garde. Similarly to the problems briefly mentioned above, theoretician
Thomas Docherty describes in his introduction to Postmodernism: A Reader the problem
inherent in a genre/form which relies upon violation of expectation for its effect (14-16). If the
avant-garde is always violational, is it violational at all? Isn’t this perpetual expectation for
violation a kind of stability which presses up against the avant-garde’s raison d’etre--to always
violate? More significantly, how does this problem compare with the problem of horror, which
must always frighten through means of ontological violation?
The difference between the problem of horror and the problem of the avant-garde is to be
found in the distinction between where violation is found in each. While the avant-garde may
find its violation in the whole of its structure, from form to subject to presentation, horror
benefits from controlling its variable surrounding the ontological irruption as much as possible.
When Mendlesohn cites the horror genre as belonging to the super-genre of intrusive fantasy, she
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makes an important observation: what intrudes is only considered an intrusion because it enters a
normative world, though, she concedes, this normative world need not be our own (114). While
the avant-garde always a delivers an experience which subverts expectations, horror delivers an
experience which delivers upon expectation enough to establish the world as normative, only
then delivering an ontologically violational element.
An illustrative counterexample may be useful. The popular podcast Welcome to Night
Vale takes the form of old-timey local radio show piped in from the small desert town of Night
Vale. It’s describable as a Lovecraftian take on The News from Lake Wobegon, complete with
descriptions of unexplainable deaths, monstrosities in the bowling alley, and a member of the
PTA who is a sentient, psychic, glowing cloud of ectoplasm. While all these come off as horrific,
particularly considering the penchant for the program to trade in sudden deaths, it never becomes
something describable as belonging to the horror genre. The reason for this is the lack of
normativity into which the events in the program enter. While the program’s narrative is horrific
as contrasted with our world, it is not horrific within the world of Night Vale. In fact, this lack of
narrative horror at the deeply disturbing events in the town are the source of its comic tone. Yes,
a pterodactyl materialized during the high school pep-rally, killing 7, but these things happen.
This kind of unbounded strangeness, while upsetting, fails to be horrific because the
horror experience remains unbounded. That is, there is no way to gain a firm footing within the
narrative world of the podcast according to which one might discern what is truly aberrant within
the world and what is not. Media theorist Isabel Pinedo identifies this “boundedness” as one of
the defining characteristics of the horror genre, both within its modern and historical horror
iterations (20). It wouldn’t be absurd to refer to a narrative like that in Welcome to Night Vale as
avant-garde, or at least it’s far more likely to answer to that label than horror, at least according
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to the categorical definition used by Mendlesohn. Horror then avoids the avant-garde stumbling
block of a perpetual horizon of violation by grounding its transgressions in a system of
normativity that always allows a contrast between that which is normative and that which is not.
The Critical Possibilities of Horror
I’ve described above a specific way of understanding the systems of expectation and
delivery within genre generally and the horror genre specifically, using Phillips’ rhetorical
maneuver as a tool to illustrate the space between expectation and delivery. The question which
presents itself now is, “So what?” What does this model allow us to understand about the horror
genre, and what does this maneuver allow to be accomplished within the horror genre
specifically?
The reason this work addresses itself to the horror genre is for the special types of effects
which are enabled through transgressive communication in a genre which makes overt value
judgments on ontological and ideological violations. In other words, the horror genre is capable
of performing unique social action by virtue of the fact that art-horror narrative, as described in
the first section of the paper, operates in two stages: First, the art horror artifact presents an
object or performance which is explicitly violational. Second, the narrative/piece responds to this
non-normativity through the story’s transition to its second act, entailing a repudiation or puttingdown of the horrific elements the narrative presents. Or, at least, this is how art horror has
traditionally operated. A number of contemporary strains of the genre, those which engage in the
kind of potentiated maneuvering I’ve described, leave off or leave incomplete the second phase
of this structure, resulting in a presentation of a horrific or violational statement which is not then
resolved.
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A metaphorical description of this process may be useful in order to illuminate the
call/response structure of traditional horror. In understanding horror as a kind of ritualized
movement into impurity, what anthropologist Mary Douglas has described in Purity and Danger,
we can imagine the horror genre raising the blinds on the structure of our categoricity, giving is a
brief glimpse of the discategorical chaos outside (Douglas 7-9). This chaos is not simply one side
of the cultural category of orderedness, but is instead the non-categorizable space of pre-semiotic
urstoff, what Paul Santilli in his treatment of horror and evil describes as a manifestation of what
Kearney called the chora, resembling the abject--that which precedes the linguistic symbolic
order, in philosopher Julia Kristeva’s sense, whose work Santilli sites in locating this boundary
(Santilli 175-176). This showing, this raising of the blind, is the first act of the horror
performance. The second, traditionally, has been the closing of this blind, the lowering of the
shade. One can imagine the classical horror artist saying, “See? Thank goodness we’re safe from
such chaos.” In much postmodern horror, however, which maneuvers within the audience’s
expectations, the blind is not lowered. The window is left open and we’re left to, at best, imagine
to ourselves that the raising itself was mere fictionalization--we’re relegated to using the
boundedness of the experience as a stop-gap for resolution the narrative failed to provide. This
failure to close what’s been opened is what Pinedo identifies as one of the hallmarks of
postmodern horror narratives, typified by a cultural tendency away from stability and
comfortable dualities (24-25).
This temporal operation of horror in stages can be understood as a manifestation of
traditional narrative structure. Like any classic story genre, horror functions in three stages:
equilibrium, disequilibrium, new equilibrium. Unlike other genres, however, the stage of
disequilibrium within the horror genre does not simply function by showing an undesirable
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challenge or task to be faced, but what constitutes existential threat through its illustration of a
state of affairs which cannot be. What faces the protagonist within a science fiction novel or a
fantasy novel may be something with which she is not familiar, something which requires a new
paradigm in order to understand, but the horror genre is characterized by the status of these
challenges as essentially, ontologically threatening. While a science fictional monster may be
filed away and dismissed as merely existing outside of, though imaginable to, the categories of
the protagonist, the horror monster instead threatens a rupture of this categoricity itself.
It is this first-act presentation phase of the horror narrative that Julia Kristeva refers to as
the abject, that which defies human attempts at categoricity by drawing attention to the very
constructed-ness of the system wherein it is impossible (1-3). The horror monster, the object of
emotive horror, is not merely frightening or threatening to life and limb: its threat operates at a
far more fundamental level. Santilli claims that this emotion is not reducible to mere dread or
terror, but is instead something more fundamental and cognitive (177). In fact, Carroll states that
this essential, ontological violation is the very source of the horror genre’s appeal. In his
“curiosity theory,” Carroll claims that the human need to properly categorize, to order and
systematize, is itself the origin of our love for horror (180-182). The horror we feel as emotion is,
although by no means identical, ontologically coterminous with the fascination we feel in the
face of the horror genre. Both our interest and our horror originate not in the categorical threat or
corruption of the horror object, but its very non-categoricity.
But what if a specific kind of maneuver is performed against the audience’s expectation
of closure? What if, instead of the above-mentioned ontic curtain being closed, it’s left wide
open, or the ideology of the narrative hero is left wounded by the appearance of this categorically
transgressive display? Horror as a set of formal attributes and as a specific kind of audience
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response is predicated on the closure of the first act, the repudiation of what’s been presented.
The window is closed, the categories are restored, the story ends. Presumably, the curiosity of
the audience has been sated, and the existential terror of the protagonist has been resolved. But
what if this doesn’t occur? What happens in the case of Pinedo’s postmodern horror? What
happens if the form of the horror deployment is a maneuvered mismatch to the expected
position?
The response to this is troubling. In Gender Trouble, theorist Judith Butler uses that titlephrase to describe acts that don’t simple transgress boundaries of acceptable gender
performance, but instead draw attention again to the constructed-ness of these boundaries (xxixxxxi). Rather than simply being troublesome, these acts trouble categoricity itself--they are the
abject as agent of ideological shift. These kinds of acts bear a sort of family resemblance to the
operation of the horror genre. Drag shows, the example Butler uses in the introduction to her
work, function by showing what is categorically troubling: a man who is woman, a woman who
is a man. This troubling occurs simultaneously in two ways. In the first, the female appearance of
the drag outfit seems to declare a mismatch with the male interior. In the second, the male
appearance of the drag performer seems to declare a mismatch with what is taken to be a female,
or not prohibitively masculine, interior (186-188). To draw an analogue to the horror genre, a
drag show which attempted to adhere to the two-act structure typical of classical horror would
end with each performer taking off their outfits and declaring, “Don’t worry: I’m really a man!”
or worse, with the audience doing the same. Obviously, this does not happen, and the
discategoricity of non-resolution forms the foreground of the performance itself. The fact of nonresolution, of things not being put back “as they should be” to match a normative ontology,
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constitutes the troubling potential of these performances. Here, discategoricity is a source of
powerful social potential.
What I’d like to claim here is that the horror genre, when it employs the transgressive
performance of the ‘generic maneuver,’ gains the potential to perform a kind of ‘trouble’ on the
categoricity of the artistic objects, and perhaps too on the audience who are called upon to relate
to the story’s protagonists. The possibility for this kind of narrative troubling potentiated in the
non-closure of the horror performance is to be located in what Carroll identifies as a necessary
element within the horror experience: audience alignment (88-96). It is not enough in a horror
narrative to have a categorically violational element--it must also be reacted to in a certain way
by the story’s normative world, generally the protagonist, and the audience must share this
alignment. In other words, the audience and the protagonist must share the same opinion or
perspective on the horror objects in the art piece in order for it to constitute an example of the
horror genre. If this sympathy is not present, the art-horror will have been a failure, or will no
longer be describable as horror as such.
Another concept from Carroll that might be useful in understanding this movement, as
well as the role of sympathy in imagining possible effects of the horror genre, is that of the
distinction between believing and entertaining (79-80) The problem with emotive responses to
the horror genre, according to Carroll, is that it simultaneously requires sufficient audience buyin to elicit an emotional response, a buy-in which would seem to require a tacit audience belief in
the images and statements provided, while also being a contained, artistic, fictionalized. To
frame this problem as a question, how can an audience respond emotively, viscerally, to what
they believe to be not only a fiction, but a fiction characterized by its very impossibility? If the
origin of the emotion or horror is a kind of epistemological troubling, how can this emotion
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coexist with my conscious understanding of the fact that the scenes and objects presented in the
film are fictional? The answer, according to Carroll, can’t simply lie in a two-stage
belief/refutation process, whereby the audience first believes the monster is real, only to
consciously banish this belief (83). The reason for this is that, if the audience believed for even a
moment that a horror monster, let’s say half-lobster/half-man, were real, they would immediately
run screaming from the theater, not merely jump in their seats. The solution Carroll finds to this
quandary is in the distinction between true belief and simply entertaining an idea. To entertain an
idea is, for Carroll, to emulate or simulate true belief, or to imagine oneself affected by their
adoption, without truly accepting these objects, such as man/lobster hybrids, as factual entities.
So, it is not the case that the audience now believes in a world in which the categories
transgressed by this film remain broken or disrupted, but it may be the case that they may now be
able to entertain a world in which they have remained disrupted, and too entertain the possibility
of this continued disruption as a kind of equilibrium itself. To return to the possible effect of this
idea-entertaining on the equilibrium-centric structure of the narrative, if the audience is able to
entertain the idea of a world in which the horror monster is, for example, not truly evil, but
instead an ally in disguise, this idea-entertaining may be allowed to work on the same plane of
abstraction as the categoricity the horror objects of the narrative occupy. In other words,
assuming the notion of idea-entertaining to be conceptually sound, and assuming that the
audience has opened a suspended space in themselves where fictional assertions are allowed to
have emotional or abstract effects, a maneuvering away from audience expectation may be able
to affect an impact in terms of the expectant categories according to which horror narrative is
comprehensible.
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In order to discern what this kind of maneuver might mean, it would require working
something out which hasn’t been treated here: precisely what it might entail to entertain a notion.
One imaginable benefit of the fantasy genres is that allows us to imagine possible worlds, and
this mode of imagination might be close to what Carroll has in mind when he talks about the
potentialized state the horror genre takes advantage of for effect. The question of what impact
specifically the imagining of an alternative world is capable of creating in an audience is one far
too vast to be explored here. It is almost a truism, however, that the experience, even in
fictionalized form, of a world which has hitherto been conceived as impossible will have the
impact of expanding an audience’s sense of what is conceivable in the world. In other words,
although fiction will likely not change the audience’s notion of what the world is, it will
necessarily impact their conception of what worlds are imaginable. This seems a decent enough
first step in conceptualizing a space for horror fiction’s critical effects.
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Chapter 4: Theorizing Night of the Living Dead
From more general theorization, let’s turn to specific instance in the history of the
contemporary horror genre, The Night of the Living Dead, by George A. Romero. In this chapter,
I will explore the operation of both intertextual presupposition and of the sociohistorical
operation of monstrous “unreason” as they demonstrate themselves within this film. I’ve chosen
this film as my artifact both for its popularity and influence--it essentially began the modern
dispensation of zombie narratives--and for the rich suite of cultural background from which it
emerged. I will begin with a general discussion of the film’s historical and social background
before moving into a more detailed account of its two-act structure, typical of the horror genre
generally.
Background of the Living Dead, Personal and Social
In this film, a group of survivors hole up in a small home in Pennsylvania while a zombie
outbreak, suggested to be alien in origin, causes the buried and unburied dead to rise back to life.
The zombies must feed, and the survivors hold off against a siege of hungry and decaying
shambling figures, succumbing to the horde one-by-one. Eventually, only one of the survivors-Ben--is left. As the outbreak seems to be subsiding, he tentatively emerges from their stronghold,
only to be shot dead by a group of local militia-men, who ostensibly mistook him for a zombie.
The film drew attention at the time of its release for its casting decision to make Ben black, a
near first in American genre films.
The Night of the Living Dead was released at the apex of the Vietnam War, a year before
the Vietnamization of the conflict, which transferred the burden of maintaining the war’s
progress to the natives of the nation combined with a troop withdrawal. Even while the film was
derided for its portrayals of graphic and lingering violence, audiences for this film were also
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inundated with unprecedented imagery of the violence in the East, with up-to-the-minute
coverage of village-burnings and napalm-bombings forcing Americans to confront the
incomprehensible violence in which they were implicated. The hordes of men who returned from
Vietnam shambled back into American consciousness as walking contradictions, simultaneously
participating in the narratives of heroism constructed around military service, even while their
performed violence and incumbent failure had been telecast into the minds of the American
public.
In combination with the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, the Cold War raged on, with
hostilities continuing to compound with the Red Threat, who were perceived as a non-rational
hivemind, bent on the proliferation of their collectivist ideology. If the violence we performed
was monstrous, the repercussions of a failure to act would be too dire to consider. The now
cliched “better red than dead” sloganeering of this era is a testament to the degree to which
Americans perceived a fall to the red menace not so much as the conclusive military obliteration
of previous wars, but as a more ambiguous loss of self, a collapse into a collectivity that
threatened the individuality promised by the American project.
From the perspective of the sociocultural/grotesque, this combination of factors strongly
contributed to situation in which the threatening actors in the society, the scions of unreason,
were both those who, in Monloen’s model, were unable to contribute to the American industrial
project, as well as those foreign agents who were not simply failing to contribute to the Western
rationalist objective, but were embodying its antithesis in the form of the Communist project.
The men who returned from Vietnam emerged as broken humans, victims of an effacement
agency which robbed them of the ability to become one with the American vision of collective
individuality. With us but still “over there,” they constituted a grim reflection of our Western

40
vision. The Communists too presented an image of inverted collectivity, a sort of hypertrophy of
American industrialism. Into such a cultural current Night of the Living Dead entered.
George A. Romero himself participated in a conflicted upbringing, simultaneously
partaking of the Western project while estranged from it through the tension of immigration and
integration. Romero’s father considered himself a Spaniard, born of parents who lived in Cuba
during its most successful years. George’s father, also George, married a Lithuanian woman
named Ann Dvorsky, and they had George, who claims he was raised in a household in which
both Spanish and Lithuanian speech were verboten--it was to be only American English
(Romero, xvi). They lived in a predominantly Italian neighborhood in which George Romero
says he was called a “spic,” and was often mistaken for being Puerto Rican, as “Latino” during
that time was often shorthand for someone of Puerto Rican descent. This conflicted with
George’s father’s hatred of this association, believing the Puerto Ricans to be turning New York
into a sewer (Romero, xvii). This dialectic of integration and friction formed the backdrop to
George A. Romero’s later generativity, his portrayals of unity and division.
From the perspective of Monleon’s sociohistorical treatment, this attempted “coming into
the social body” by Romero’s family may be seen as a kind of invasion in the inverse, as
immigrant populations were often themselves seen as harbingers of monstrous change within the
reasoned communities of the “real” Americans. While this immigration, this integration, was
seen as an essential quality of the American experience, it is impossible to avoid the
contradictions inherent in a culture which simultaneously gloried in the acceptance into the
social body anyone who wished to do so, and refused right to entry anyone who refused to cast
off their history and participate in the project of integration. This has always been a distinctly
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American concept, as in the injunction to “Kill the Indian, Save the Man” in the forced
integration of Native American populations only a few decades prior.
As an aside, it bears mentioning that Monleon’s treatment of the sociohistorical function
of the Gothic restricts itself to European examples, and the American project differed somewhat.
While, according to Monleon, the integration of unreasoned populations into the reasoned
European body was an instance of conflict and tension, the American relationship with this
process is a bit more fraught. While there has been a robust history of discrimination against
immigrant populations in the United States, the US has also adopted a sort of fantasy theme
surrounding the integration of these populations. Given this objective, the monstrosity of
unreason within the American project is perhaps best imagined not as a monstrosity of
insurgence, as insurgence is a necessary precursor to integration, but a failure of integration
consequent to that insurgence. Immigration is well and truly American, just as long as those
concerned are able to well and truly “melt” into the idiomatic Melting Pot.
Subtexts of Unreason in Night of the Living Dead
While there have been diverse interpretations of The Night of the Living Dead--a work so
paradigmatic in its inspiration of a new genre dispensation is likely to generate such discussion-it’s worth looking for a moment at Romero’s own interpretation of his film’s subtext. Romero
himself claims that the misinterpretation of his film has led to a great deal of its success. The true
subtext of the film, he claims, is one of failure, not valiant resistance. He says the failure of he
survivors to survive is not simply a result of the inexorable tide of the coming hordes, but instead
results from their failure to truly come together in their resistance. As a result of this failure to
integrate, they bring about their own demise.
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What do we make of this from the perspective of Unreason? Given our discussion above
of the function of the failure to integrate as a site of unreason, the failure of this film’s characters
to correlate and integrate their objectives can be seen as a microcosmic mirroring of the failure to
integrate with those zombies who constitute the film’s antagonists. In Monelon’s theory, a failure
to integrate with the social body is what creates sites of “unreason.” The narrative presented in
Night of the Living Dead presents two such sites--one of the zombies as an unreasoned mass, and
the other of the survivors failing to constitute together a reasoned body. It is both then a narrative
of monstrosity, and one of a failure to respond to monstrosity in a properly reflexive and
integrated way. One compounds the other, and they each become functions of a broader
unreasoning.
In the context of a sociohistorical interpretation, the function of the zombies in this film
can be better understood through an examination of their origin. If monsters began on the
outskirts and then immigrated to the center of the social body, whence came this film’s zombies?
Within the film, it’s briefly mentioned on a radio broadcast that a probe has recently returned
from near Venus, though has exploded in the earth’s atmosphere. It’s never made clear if this is
the genesis of the zombie outbreak, but it’s generally adopted as such. The very inexplicability of
the outbreak contributes to its monstrosity. Were the zombies simply scientized and explained
away, they would cease to be threateningly human, grotesquely reminiscent of ourselves. As it is
however, they remain ultimately unexplained (at least until the film’s sequels), making them feel
as inexorable as an act of god.
Zombies are almost unique in the annals of popular horror for in their resemblance of us-they are literally our friends, our family, our neighbors, only distorted and modified to a kind of
paradigmatically unreasoning mindlessness that casts them as negativized mirrors of ourselves.
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They are us through a glass darkly. If the monstrous is, after all, a grotesque combination of what
should not be combined, what could be more sacrosanct than ourselves? What could be more
damnable than a version of ourselves lacking that quality according to which we are human?
Here is a possible sociohistorical casting of the system of relations I’ve above described,
within an historical context. While it is likely not conclusive, and likely not comprehensively
reflective of Romero’s intentions in his portrayal, it provides an interesting lens through which to
view the events of the film. If the zombies in the film are reflections, as Monleon would claim,
of our sense of the origination of unreason within our culture, they may be construed as
representative of the same genus of perceived mindless contamination and dehumanized
humanity on display in the spread and intensification of the communist threat. By the same token
that the Communist threat was not characterized by an absence of reason, an absence of industry,
but rather by a perversion and problematic recasting of these elements, the zombies in this film
are not hideously inhuman--they are hideously human. As Stieg would attest, the very humanity,
the very mundanity of their mein is the foundation of the grotesquery they present. If we were to
accept such an interpretation, then what to make of the survivors? They are us. They are us in all
our variety: black, white, man, woman, old, young. Their failure, as Romero identifies it, is the
failure of their perceived strength, and an echo of Romero’s own history: a failure to integrate.
Night of the Living Dead and the Two-Act Horror Function
Turning now to the presuppositional operation of the horror genre, how can this
understanding of horror as a two-act performance from grotesque representation to judgement be
applied to an understanding of Night of the Living Dead, and how can this interplay be
productively understood as a manifestation of Monleon’s sociohistorical architecture? Just as
preceding horror films, among which there were a number of zombie stories, Night of the Living
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Dead plays according to the rule of the two-part structure inherent within the architecture of the
horror narrative. An absence of audience expectation would render the story a non-starter, while
a failure of resolution would render it not a story at all. Romero’s film, however, provides a
subversion of expectation for audiences accustomed to the horror structures typical of Fifties and
Sixties horror.
To begin, with it bears mentioning that audiences experiencing Night of the Living Dead
did not have the broad base of zombie-based horror experiences and expectations that a modern
viewer might bring to these types of films. Zombies are our current monster du jour. In film,
television, comics, video games, and podcasts, modern audiences are thoroughly versed in the
lore of the zombie invasion. Given the modern effulgence of zombie-based media, it may be
difficult to imagine a horror-media-substrate in which zombies were not thought of primarily in
the form of invasion, but as individual monsters more typical of classical horror-monster
narratives. Zombies still existed, certainly, but not in the forms to which modern viewers,
readers, and players have become accustomed. In films such as White Zombie, I Walked with a
Zombie, Revolt of the Zombies, and numerous others, all predecessors to modern zombie
interpretations, these monsters do not travel in the hordes familiar to modern audiences. Instead,
they are individuals, often the creation of voodoo priests, perhaps more reminiscent of a
spiritualized Frankenstein’s monster than the modern invasion narratives familiar to modern
viewers.
In addition to this difference, the zombie films before Night of the Living Dead, such as
they were, largely centered around zombies springing from Caribbean and African locales,
allowing these monsters and their creators to be cast as foreigners not only in an ontological
sense, but also possessing a physicality which marked them as geographically other, being as
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there were most often black or of Eastern descent, flagging them as inherent outsiders. In both I
Walked with a Zombie and White Zombie, the zombies on display are dark skinned, bestial,
brutish. They are portrayed as sufficiently inhuman in their mein--filthy bodies and bugged out
eyes--to flag as grotesque even if they were not rendered mindless my the actions of their
creators. These monsters are of the true Outsider type, identified by Monleon as belonging to
early stages of Gothic development, wherein the horror of the narrative derives from that which
is properly, geographically Outside the social body. If the normative Western heroes of these
films exemplify the normativity of the enlightened social body, their monstrous foils constitute
the most foreign threat imaginable.
While the horror artifacts of the era preceding Night of the Living Dead may have
acclimated viewers to threatening outsiders, monsters emerging from the periphery of society,
and even to the possibility of monsters as grotesque reinterpretations of ourselves ala stories such
as Jekyll and Hyde, Romero’s paradigm marked the first instance of a monstrosity that
encompassed the whole of the social body, a monster that wasn’t simply “us,” but “Us.” In Night
of the Living Dead, the zombies are not foreigners. They are not distant threats from exotic
locales which hapless Westerners may encounter through ill luck. Rather, they are us. The
zombies of Romero’s creation emerge from within the social body, in a visceral sense ARE the
social body, and are far more emblematic of Monleon’s later stages of Gothic development than
preceding horror narratives.
The zombies presented in Night of the Living Dead are not then merely some thematic
amplification of preceding zombie tropes, but are instead demonstrative of an entirely novel
paradigm, the Zombie Invasion (Bishop 94). While in the other movies mentioned, it became the
actions of the protagonists which unwittingly brought them in contact with the zombie threat,
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Night of the Living Dead brought the threat home, foisting them upon the group of survivors with
a suddennes that entirely defies any attempt to frame them as paradigmatically foreign. In fact,
given their emergence from the very ground, it is arguable that the zombies portrayed in
Romero’s films are perhaps more native to this land than ourselves.
Notably, while the zombie narratives coming before Night of the Living Dead frame
zombies as invasive anomalies, things emerging from the periphery, essentially from outside the
social body, Romero’s dispensation shifted this focus to zombies as a threat of replacement for
the social body. The very collectivity of this new threat is the key to its threatening nature. While
previous films had portrayed monstrous invasion--from blobs to aliens to demons--Romero’s
zombies were the first instance of invasive insiders, monsters native to the social body while
simultaneously entirely inimical to it. The zombies here are predators, and the siege setup of the
film seems to portray the conflict as a zero sum game which must culminate either with the
zombies’ elimination or our own.
Placed within the established horror framework of expectation/delivery, the Romero
zombie paradigm does not simply subvert audience expectations as to delivery, but establishes an
entirely new network of expectations, substantially different from those of the preceding zombie
films. Zombie scholar Kyle Bishop has described this shift as one from a framing of the narrative
goal as the reestablishment of normative society to instead one of survival (96). How does one
go about simply eliminating the threat when the threat is so all-encompassing that it threatens to
replace the normativity against which it articulates itself?
Horror films as well as zombie films preceding Night of the Living Dead also tend to
deliver a different sort of narrative resolution from Romero’s film, one far more steeped in the
classical models of narrative resolution. In the three pre-Romero films mentioned above, the
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narrative resolution is predictable: the zombie(s) die, their creator dies, the heroes stand battered
but victorious. Within such narratives, what is the threat? Simply the death of the hero. If the
chiselled American is unable to put an end to the Zombie threat, he will die, simple as that. The
zombie-creating priest may survive to wreak havoc again, but it will be a havoc of the periphery,
never coming close to the heart of the social body. Perhaps the priest will be destroyed in the
sequel.
In traditional horror architecture, the narrative structure is framed as Society vs. Monster,
where the combined mores and standards of the social body are articulated as resistance to the
monstrous threat, neutralizing it such as to return the situation to the status quo. In Night of the
Living Dead this narrative mechanism is subverted, and the society presented, the ragtag group
of survivors is incapable of aligning their intentions in such a way as to resist the zombie threat.
The zombie threat too is reframed, no longer captured by simple designation as an Other. While
the zombies remain grotesquely foreign, they become a sort of social assemblage unto
themselves, constituting nothing so much as a hideously unified counter-society to the
disorganized normativity of the survivors. With the zombies presenting such a monstrous unity
to the disjointed efforts of the film’s heroes, can the victory of the disorganized remnants of
normalcy be thought of as an unqualified return to the status quo?
So, given this subversion of audience expectation as to the resolution of the monster
narrative, what expectations have been explicitly violated, and what is the function of these
violations?
First, within the zombie tradition prior to Night of the Living Dead, victory is portrayed
as a kind of normative inevitability, where even a failure to defeat the monster is imagined as a
reaffirmation of social normativity. If the hero fails, if the zombies win, if the priest continues his
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reign of terror, the monsters in traditional narrative architecture remain monstrous. They
continue to be outsiders, peripheral invaders and Others, operating on the outskirts of a
normative society which will, presumably, continue to see them as exemplifying an outsider
status. To put it in brief, even if the monster wins, there will still be a society to perceive that
monster as monstrous--they will continue to be an outsider to a normative inside.
By violating this expectation as to the presumed stability of the social status quo, Night of
the Living Dead posited the possibility of the monstrous replacement of the social body, a reality
reflective of the social circumstances within which it emerged. If the monsters in the Zombie
Invasion paradigm are victorious, they become the normative center. The game within a Romero
style zombie film is, as above, zero sum. Either the zombie threat will be neutralized, or it will
become something like a zombie planet, a grim visioned imagined in later Romero zombie films,
notably Day of the Dead, where the survivors are themselves peripheral outsiders to a status quo
wherein zombies have replaced humans as the dominant surface-dwelling species.
Second, the unity of the social body against which monsters articulate themselves is an
operating assumption of much horror narrative, in which the Monstrous is portrayed as
antithetical to the unified front of non-monstrous normativity. The chiselled American is
recognizable as the hero of preceding zombie films because he’s exemplary of chiselledAmericanness. It is presumed that, although he may act alone in his crusade against the foreign
zombie threat, he operates with the implicit sanction of a society that also perceives the
narrative’s monsters as monstrous. While he may only be the only one aware of the threat, his
solitude is only the more reflective of his need to bring the normative Inside to bear on the
Outside threat.
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Night of the Living Dead subverts this expectation in great fashion, with the failure of the
characters portrayed to integrate and unify the very cause of their failure--the zombies are
monstrous, yes, but their siege only succeeds by virtue of the failure of the non-zombie
characters to come together in a body as tightly knit as the animalistic social body of the zombies
themselves. Night of the Living Dead asks what happens when the Inside is put under sufficient
pressure from the Outside threat that its assumption of unity and coherence comes under
question. The answer to this question is unequivocal: when placed in a position where characters
are tasked to either integrate and unify or die, the film ends with a montage of carnage, and our
hero is thrown on a pyre with his fellow dead. The Inside, Romero argues, may be less unified
than it might seem.
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V: Conclusion
In the preceding chapters, we have moved from a general discussion of the horror genre
as a demonstration of agentive unreason within Monelon’s framework through a discussion of
the presuppositional, two-act structure of the horror genre, as well as how this two-part structure
presents a potential site for critical action. We’ve then explored a popular example of this genre
in the form of George Romero’s Night of the Living Dead, which reflects notions of unreason
both from within Romero’s own life and within the culture, entertainment and political, from
which it was written.
As a site of further study, although the two-act structure of horror seems to dovetail
decently with Monleon’s sociohistorical model of the gothic, it would be interesting to see how it
plays with the other theorists’ models of horror genre. This study, although it has made nods to
the works of numerous horror theorists, has restricted its synthesis primarily to the works of Jose
Monleon and Edwards & Graulund, whose theories of sociohistorical gothicism and grotesque
aesthetic have been treated as two expressions of the same theoretical move. What might be
generated if these theories were united with a theoretical approach from outside of literary
theory, such as either feminist or critical race theory? The latter would be a particularly
interesting lens through which to examine Night of the Living Dead. Because of the genetic
relationships between divergent theories of horror narrativity and aesthetic, any such
combinatoriality is likely to open some interesting parallax; what has been presented here is only
one such conjunction among many.
Within this study’s purview specifically, further work could also be done in disentangling
the notions of personal/psychological unreason and cultural/sociohistorical unreason in their
operation within the field of horror narrative. While it may be in poor taste to attempt to
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disarticulate these two domains, the personal and the social seem, at least in the case of this
study’s artifact, to be easily enough discerned to generate interesting results. But what are the
boundaries of this distinction, and how safe can it be to make such a distinction? This is will
remain for the time an open question.
The horror genre generates perennial interest, and an overview of the topic creates the
impression there have nearly been as many works written on the genre as such as have been
written WITHIN the genre. It is likely that, just as each exemplar of the horror genre may
indicate something about the conditions of its authorship, historical and personal, each example
of theory meant to explain these works will similarly demonstrate something about their author
and the circumstances of their origin. This historical changeability is similarly the source both of
continued interest in this body of theory and in the works which generate it. In line with Freud’s
theory of the unheimlich, horror literature and horror theory each present us with the impression
of something new, but perhaps only because it’s been forgotten. They are each parts of the
genre’s uncanny mirror, which shows us what is bizarre, threatening, grotesque, troubling,
uncanny, but only through the use of what is eerily familiar. What we fear most is what we
already know.
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